巴菲特眼中的商业：How to Think About Businesses（下）

编者按：本文来自为西南公众号“港股那点事”（ID：hkstocks），36氪经授权发布。

What do you do if business changes are recognized?

当你发现一个公司发生变化时会怎么做？

If a good business is doing dumb things with your money, it is wise to get out. The option is always there to try to persuade the business to change its mind but this is difficult. Investment techniques must be simpatico with all.

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2001

URL:

Time: 2001

如果一个好的企业在用你的钱去做蠢事，退出是明智的选择。当然，尝试说服公司改变主意永远是优先选项，但这很难。投资技巧应和一切和谐相处。

来源：BRK 2001年年会

时间：2001年

Do you know of any examples of companies that have lost and regained their competitive advantage?

据你所知，有没有公司曾经失去自己的竞争优势，但后来又失而复得？

There aren't many examples of companies that lose and then regain competitive advantage. I have a friend who likes taking over lousy businesses and trying to turn them into great businesses. I asked him for examples of this over the past 100 years (and he couldn't name very many).

这种例子并不太多。我有一个朋友，他喜欢接管那些不讨人喜欢的公司，然后尝试把他们变成优秀的企业。我一直有问他有没有改造成功的例子（结果他也说不出来几个）。

Sometimes businesses have problems, but haven't lost their competitive advantages. When GEICO had problems (in the mid-1970s), the model wasn't broken.

One example:Pepsi lost its edge post-WW II when costs went up, but they successfully changed. To some extent Gillette lost its competitive edge in the 1930s topenny blades, but then regained it.

有时候一个公司有问题并不代表会失去它的竞争优势。20世纪70年代时GEICO也出现了问题，但是它们也并没有因此破产。

但百事可乐是一个很好的例子。第二次世界大战过后，它们失去了自己的优势，但后来他们成功转型了。某种程度来说吉列也是一个例子。上世纪30年代的时候他们失去了竞争优势地位，但是后来又夺回来了。

But generally speaking, when a company loses its edge, it's very difficult to regain. Packard (cars) went downscale one year and never regained its upscale image. Department stores have done this. You can always juice sales by going down market, but it's hard to go back up market.

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes

URL:

Time: 2003

不过整体来说，公司一旦失去自己的竞争优势，就很难重夺回来了。比如帕卡德汽车（Packard），有一年它们开始走下坡路，然后就再也没有起来过，最后消失了。百货商场也在重复同样的道路。在市场上走下坡路容易，下去再上来可就难了。

来源：BRK 2003年年会Tilson笔记

时间：2003年 

Impact of regulation on businesses?

法律法规会对企业造成什么影响？

In some businesses, regulatory changes have a big impact, others none. We just try to think intelligently about any business that we’re in. What regulatory changes might there be? What might the impact be? If we’re in furniture retailing,we’re not going to think about it. It’s up to Charlie and me to think about this and weigh it in our evaluation of a company.

Tom Murphy (the former head of Capital Cities and Cap Cities/ABC) was way ahead of us on this one.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes

• URL:

• Time: 2004

对于某些公司来说，法律法规的改变会给它们带来巨大影响。我们尝试尽可能聪明地看待我们现在涉足的企业：它们所处的行业未来可能会迎来什么样的政策变化？会带来什么影响？如果是家具零售行业，我们就不会去考虑这个问题。这里就全由查理和我来衡量这个因素在给公司估值中的分量了。

这方面汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy，大都会通讯公司Capital Cities和美国广播公司ABC的前掌门人）比我们超前很多。

来源：BRK2004年年会Tilson笔记

时间：2004年 

Would you commenton the quality of earnings in capital-intensive businesses, like utilities?

你会怎么评价资本密集型行业的盈利，比如公共事业？

Buffett:Capital-intensive industries outside the utility sector scare me more. We get decent returns on equity. You won’t get rich, but you won’t go broke either.You are better off in businesses that are not capital intensive.

Munger: A lot of moats have been filling up with sand lately.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes

• URL:

• Time: 2009

巴菲特：公共事业以外的资本密集型行业会更让我害怕。我们还是可以获得不错的权益回报的。你不会因此变得富有，但你也不会因此破产。不过你在非资本密集型的行业中可以表现更好。

芒格：感觉最近很多公司的护城河都在逐渐被填平。

来源：BRK 2009年年会Bruni笔记

时间：2009年 

Please talk about the shift to investing in capital intensive business and the ultimate impact on intrinsic value. Help us understand the time value of the necessary capital expenditures.

请谈谈你最近对资本密集型企业的投资以及其对企业股票内在价值的最终影响。能帮我们更好地了解什么是必要资本支出的时间价值吗？

WB: It’s clear you understand the question well, and it as important a question as you can ask. We are putting big money in big businesses with good economics, but not as good as when we were dealing with smaller amounts. $40m of capital required in See’s and it earns much more than that. If we could put in more we would. But wonderful businesses don’t soak up capital – we had $2.2b operating earnings inQ1. We have to put it out as intelligently as we can. When we find them, we’ll buy them. Can we put it to work intelligently? We think capital intensive businesses we have bought are good, working well. But it can’t work brilliantly, we can’t spend all that money and still get high returns. But does that mean we should pay out excess capital instead? No, because we think they can earn a good return even with the need to make capital investments incertain businesses. We are better paying it out only if we can’t translate it into more than $1 of present value. In our judgment with BNSF we did it, but scorecard will only come in 10 to 20 yrs. In Mid American, we have done it. Butit won’t be a Coca-Cola – which doesn’t need as much capital. I hope we don’t disappoint you. If anyone expects brilliant returns from this base at Berkshire, we don’t know how to do it.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes

• URL:

• Time: 2010

WB：看来你对这个问题很有见解，这也是一个很重要的问题。我们往一些经济状况很不错的大型企业投了一大笔钱，但表现并没有之前投钱没那么多的时候好。我们往喜诗糖果里投了4千万美元，但它们赚的钱远超于此。如果当时可以投更多，我们会的。好的公司不会只一味地需求资本——第一季度喜诗糖果的营业收入达到了22亿美元。我们需要把获利拿出来，尽可能聪明地投到其他地方去——也就是说，如果我们找得到好标的的话，我们就会去买。用这笔钱可以获得不错的回报率么？可以，我们投资的资本密集型企业就表现得挺不错。但他们没办法表现得（像喜诗糖果那样）出类拔萃，因为我们现在手上的资本规模太庞大了，不可能找到那么多（像喜诗糖果那样）高回报率的标的，所以没办法全花完。那怎么办？某些行业的某些公司还是可以获得不错的回报率的。如果我们没法自己把手上的一块钱在未来转换成比这一块钱现值更多的现金流，那还不如把这笔钱投出去。像我们之前买的BNSF就是这样的例子，不过它的成绩单可能得等上10到20年。我们当时买中美能源（MidAmerican）也是出于同样的想法。但是这些公司需要大量的资金，所以他们不可能成为可口可乐（这种不用多少资金就能获得高回报的公司）。我不是故意要让你失望的，但如果你想了解我们公司在这方面是否获得了特别特别高的回报，我只能说，没有，我们也不知道要怎么做。

来源：BRK 2010年年会Boodell笔记

时间：2010年 

How do you place a value on intangible assets? What are the signs of great ““moats”” around abusiness and great managements? Do you place a dollar value on this? What discount rates do you use?

如何对无形资产进行估值？有“深护城河”和优秀管理层的公司有哪些特质？你也会在这上面用一块钱估值法么？采用什么贴现率？

We use a treasury rate for comparability across companies and time. As far as we’re concerned, a dollar earned by The Lucky Horseshoe Company is the same as a dollar earned by an Internet company -even if the market is a lot more enthusiastic about the Internet company dollar.

Valuation is anart. Look at Wrigley: pick a figure for what the volumes will be, their prices,their competition, the likelihood of management being bright with cash. All ofthat figures into the moat and its size, and what that business will earn.

我们采用类似国库券利率的估值方法来比较不同时段的不同公司。一个幸运马蹄铁公司赚的一块钱和一个互联网公司赚的一块钱都是一样的，虽然市场对后者的热情更甚。

估值是一项艺术。以箭牌（Wrigley）为例，判断其护城河深浅可以看它的股价、竞争地位、管理层水平及其为公司带来大量现金的可能性。这些数据也可以帮我们去判断公司会挣多少钱。

There aren’t many businesses with a terrific moat. Coke has a terrific moat, right down to the container. How many other products can people identify correctly when they’re blind folded? Coke has not just market share, it has a great share of mind. People associate Coke with good things.Ten years from now, the moat formed by that share of mind will be even greater.

No formula infinance tells you that the moat is 28 feet wide and 16 feet deep. That’s what drives the a cademics crazy. Theycan compute standard deviations and betas, but they can’t understand moats. Maybe I’m being too hard on the academics.

有深护城河的公司并不是很多，可口可乐算一个。想象一下，（除了可口可乐，）人们被蒙住眼睛的时候还能猜中什么品牌？它已经不仅是市场占有率的问题，它已经成功“占有”了大多数人的想法，人们已经习惯把可口可乐和美好事物联系在一起。再过十年，这种“想法占有”的程度会更深。

金融界里并不存在一个公式会让你准确算出这个公司的“护城河”有28英尺宽16英尺深，相信这会让很多“学术派”都抓狂，他们可以精确算出标准差和beta，但却无法理解“护城河”。可能我这也是对他们要求太高了。

CM: You’re not sufficiently critical of the academics. They remind me of Long Term Capital Management - why do smart people do dumb things against their own self-interest?

Now we have whole finance departments full of destructive self-pity, which is one of the most dangerous forces in the world. And you are paying to send your children to those schools!

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 1999

• URL:

• Time: 1999

CM：我觉得你对学术派的批评还不够到位呢。他们让我想起了美国长期资本管理公司（Long Term Capital Management）——为什么聪明人总喜欢去做违背自己真正兴趣的蠢事？

现在各个大学里的金融学院都充斥着这种自怨自艾的“书呆子”，这是毁灭性的，是世界上最危险的现象之一。而你还要付钱把自己的孩子送进这种学校！

来源：BRK 1999年年会

时间：1999年 

Not too long ago, a reasonable person might have concluded that Kellogg and Campbell Soup had big moats around their businesses, but that has proven not to be the case and their stocks have languished. What might we learn from this?

不久之前，一个挺靠谱的人曾经说过家乐氏（Kellogg）和金宝汤（Campbell Soup）有很深的“护城河”，但它们现在股价都重挫了，证明这个说法并不正确。我们从中学到了什么呢？

I'm not anexpert on these companies, but my understanding is that Kellogg pushed their pricing too far. They didn't have to moat they thought they had versus General Mills and other major competitors. Campbell's problems are more related to lifestyle changes of Americans. Soup fits in a little less well than it did 40 years ago.

我对这些公司并不算是专家，但我的看法是家乐氏之前拉股价太卖力了，他们的竞争对手有通用磨坊食品（General Mills）和其他强敌，他们以为的深“护城河”其实并不存在。金宝汤的问题更多是因为美国人的生活方式变了，罐头汤已经没有40年前这么符合人们的生活习惯了。

With soft drinks, there has been no decrease in demand for decades. 30% of liquid consumption of Americans is soda and 40% of that is Coke products, so 1/8th ofU.S. liquid consumption is Coke products.

Coffee and milk consumption has been declining every year -- it's clear where preferences go once people start drinking soda.

但软饮则不一样，过去几十年对软饮的需求没有下降过。美国人30%的饮料消费都花在苏打饮料上，其中40%的消费都是可口可乐的产品，也就是说，全美国八分之一的饮料消费就是可口可乐。

咖啡和牛奶的消费则每年都在下降——自从苏打进入人们的生活，偏好高下立见。

These trends are almost impossible not to happen in developing countries, where the consumption of Coke products is 1/50th what it is in the U.S. -- though Coke could screw it up by pricing too high.

就算是在发展中国家，虽然可口可乐的消费只有美国的五十分之一，但这种趋势也不大可能被避免，当然，如果可口可乐定价太高，还是有可能把这个巨大发展潜力给扼杀掉的。

Coke has also benefited from its relative price. Since 1930, its cost per ounce has only doubled. This very low price inflation has contributed to the increase in percapita consumption.

可口可乐的发展也得益于原材料的价格没有太大变动。从1930年代到现在，它每盎司的成本价只翻了一倍，通胀率是很低的。这也带动了人均消费的提高。

Munger:"Kellogg's and Campbell's moats have also shrunk due to the increased buying power of supermarkets and companies like Wal-Mart. The muscle power of Wal-Mart and Costco has increased dramatically."

There is always a battle between the retailers and manufacturers of branded products. In the1930s, A&P had its own line of branded products that did very well. It would be interesting to know what happened.

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2001 Tilson Notes

• URL:

• Time: April 2001

芒格：像沃尔玛这样的超市崛起也导致家乐氏和金宝汤的护城河“缩水”。这种超市的购买力上升得非常多。

而零售商和品牌生产商之间的“战争”永远都不会停止。20世纪30年代的时候，大西洋和太平洋食品公司（A&P）有自己的生产线，而且做得挺好的。但如果你们知道它之后发生了什么事情，你会觉得非常有趣。

来源：BRK 2001年年会Tilson笔记

时间：2001年4月

What's your opinion of downsizing and outsourcing?

你如何看待企业规模缩小和业务外包？

Whether or not such actions are necessary depends on the industry: if it’sa growing industry, you don’t need such measures. If there’s not enough growth in an industry to support all of the players, it’s in society’s best interests to have the most output produced with the least inputs - but society needs to help those who find themselves on the outside. ““I believe this has been more of a media story than a real news story,”” Buffett explained. ““I don’t believe there’s a greater percentage of people displaced as a percentage of the work force than there was ten years ago.””

Monger’s take on the situation: ““I can’t name afirm that was harmed by over-downsizing. I can rattle off name after name of ones that were ruined by bloat. It’s fashionable to say downsizing is wrong: I think it’s wrong that the firms got in such a state that they needed downsizing.”

• Source: BRK Annual Meeting 1997

• URL:

• Time: May 1997

行业走向决定着企业是否需要采取这些措施：如果这个行业正在成长，你就无需考虑这些；但如果行业的成长性已经不足以支撑其中所有的玩家，那最符合整个社会利益的做法就是尽量用最少的投入换最大的产出，这个时候就会需要减小企业规模或者业务外包了。不过我觉得这更像个媒体故事而不是新闻故事。我不认为这会带来比十年前更多的失业。

芒格：在我的认知里，没有因为规模过度缩小而受到伤害的公司。但我可以说一堆因为过度扩张而受伤的公司。好像现在说规模缩小不好是一种潮流，但我觉得一个公司走到了需要缩小规模这一步才是犯了错误。

来源：BRK 1997年年会

时间：1997年5月

相关阅读：

巴菲特眼中的商业：How to Think About Businesses（中）

巴菲特眼中的商业：How to Think About Businesses（上）